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483 
Patent Working Requirements:              
Historical and Comparative Perspectives 
Marketa Trimble* 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, commentators referred to 
patent working requirements as the most contentious contemporary concept 
in patent law, and working requirements were at the center of discussions 
about revisions to the Paris Convention. By the end of the twentieth century 
it seemed that working requirements attracted less attention; the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) did not 
expressly mention working requirements at all. However, some TRIPS 
provisions do arguably relate to such requirements; in fact, some 
commentators believe that the TRIPS Agreement prevents countries from 
maintaining such requirements, at least in some forms. Although the lack 
of interest in working requirements might suggest that the requirements are 
no longer important, national patent systems continue to struggle with the 
question reflected in the requirements: whether the rights of a patent owner 
should be limited (and if so, under what conditions) when the patent owner 
does not practice his invention at all, or does not practice it sufficiently. 
This Article discusses the origins and development of patent working 
requirements and examines the rationales for, and purposes of, the 
requirements. This Article points out the links and interactions between 
working requirements and the other components of patent systems and shows 
that all of the components, including working requirements, serve to calibrate 
the systems to the particular needs of individual countries, including the needs 
of their complex legal systems. To the extent that international patent law 
harmonization continues to allow some leeway for countries to calibrate their 
national patent systems according to their differing national needs, and to 
the extent that international law has not foreclosed countries’ rights to 
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introduce and maintain working requirements, countries should use working 
requirements to best serve the purposes of their own patent systems. 
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A patent working requirement (“working requirement”) is a component of 
many, though not all, national patent systems. A working requirement is a provision 
of a national patent statute that states that an owner of a patent must practice his or 
her patented invention (i.e., to manufacture or import the invention) within the 
country that granted the patent. Many variations of the requirement exist among 
the diverse national patent systems, and the various national requirements have 
evolved over time. Countries have differed, and continue to differ, in their 
definitions of a sufficient working of a patent and the proper territorial scope of 
the working of a patent, the circumstances under which they will excuse the 
nonworking of a patent, the period they mandate as the period within which the 
working must occur, and the sanctions that they will impose for the nonworking of 
a patent.1 This Article discusses the history and features of patent working 
requirements from a comparative perspective and suggests that patent working 
requirements not be evaluated in isolation, but only in the context of the national 
patent systems in which they operate. 
Working requirements have been the subject of negotiations on international 
patent cooperation since the nineteenth century, but interest in the requirements 
 
1. For comparative literature on patent working requirements from different periods, see, for 
example, ALFRED CARPMAEL & EDWARD CARPMAEL, PATENT LAWS OF THE WORLD: COLLECTED, 
EDITED, AND INDEXED (William Clowes & Sons 2d ed., rev. 1889); DAVID FULTON, A PRACTICAL 
TREATISE ON PATENTS, TRADE MARKS AND DESIGNS, WITH A DIGEST OF COLONIAL AND 
FOREIGN PATENT LAWS 167–246 ( Jordan & Sons 17th ed. 1894); ADOLF KRAETZER, DER 
AUSFÜHRUNGSZWANG IM PATENTRECHT (1910); STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,  
AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 425–29 (HARVARD  
UNIV. PRESS 1975); K. SCHROETER & R. POSCHENRIEDER, DER AUSÜBUNGSZWANG IN DER 
PATENTGESETZGEBUNG ALLER LÄNDER (M. Millenet 1934); JAN VOJÁČEK, A SURVEY OF THE 
PRINCIPAL NATIONAL PATENT SYSTEMS 59–63 (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1936); Thomas Cottier, Shaheeza 
Lalani & Michelangelo Temmerman, Use It or Lose It: Assessing the Compatibility of the Paris 
Convention and TRIPS Agreement with Respect to Local Working Requirements, 17 J. INT’L  
ECON. L. 437, 461–71 (2014); Hans Peter Kunz-Hallstein, Verschärfter Ausübuingszwang für 
Patente? GRUR INT’L 234, 352 (1981); Bernard Olcott, Realistic Aspects of Working Foreign Patents, 
45 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 315 (1963); Nicholas A. Vonneuman, Conditionally Exclusive Patent Rights and 
the Patent Clause of the Constitution, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 391, 397–407 (1956). 
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has fluctuated over time.2 Today, two factors fuel an interest in working 
requirements: First, working requirements have been considered and used as a 
means through which developing and least-developed countries might mitigate 
some of the negative effects of the increased level of patent protection that these 
countries introduced under the pressure of international harmonization. Second, 
working requirements have attracted the attention of scholars who seek tools to 
combat the phenomenon of undesirable patent enforcement practices in the United 
States by the so-called patent assertion entities, who often, though not always, are 
nonpracticing entities3—entities that do not practice the patents that they strive to 
enforce.4 Because current U.S. patent law does not include a general patent working 
requirement per se,5 commentators have examined other national patent laws for 
examples of, and models for, such a requirement.6 This Article complements the 
existing literature on working requirements by providing insights into the larger 
context in which national versions of patent working requirements have evolved. 
This Article does not attempt to determine whether patent working 
requirements in general, or in any particular permutations, comply with the TRIPS 
Agreement7 or other obligations that countries may have. Some commentators 
believe that the TRIPS Agreement requires that countries abolish or amend their 
working requirements; the TRIPS Agreement does not specifically address working 
 
2. LADAS, supra note 1, at 519–20; EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 45–57 (1951). 
       3.     Cf. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 809 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
4. E.g., Maayan Perel, From Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs) to Non-Practiced Patents (NPPs): 
A Proposal for a Patent Working Requirement, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 747 (2015) (proposing a working 
requirement); Daniel Tagliente, Shooting Blanks: The Ineffectiveness of the Executive Branch’s Entrance 
into the Great Patent Troll Hunt, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 311 (2015) (advocating for a  
working requirement). These are not the first instances in which commentators have discussed the 
possibility and desirability of introducing working requirements into the U.S. patent system. See, e.g., 
WILLIAM OLDFIELD, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF PATENT LAWS: TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 23417, 
H.R. REP. NO. 62-1161 (1912); Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An 
Idea Whose Time Has Come, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 666, 673 (1988); Timothy W. Hagan & Steven  
J. Henry, Is a Compulsory Licensing Statute Necessary? A Study of the U.S. and Foreign Experience, 
7 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1207 (1975); Floyd W. Vaughan, Suppression and Non-Working of 
Patents, with Special Reference to the Dye and Chemical Industries, 9 AM. ECON. REV. 693, 700 (1919). 
5. See infra notes 26–28. On the one period during which the working requirement was imposed 
in the United States, see infra note 22 and accompanying text. 
6. Some proposals are not for working requirements, but have features that resemble such 
requirements. E.g., Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The Role of 
Compulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 977, 1002, 1002 n.83 (1977); Amanda Frye, “Inextricably 
Commingled”: A Restitution Perspective in Patent Remedies, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 669, 692–93 (2013); 
John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2155 (2007); Mark  
A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007); Oskar 
Liivak, When Nominal Is Reasonable: Damages for the Unpracticed Patent, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1031, 1062 
(2015); Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Right Not To Use in Property and Patent Law, 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1451 (2013); Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: 
Could A Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 
1351, 1357 (2013); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 345 (2010). 
7. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
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requirements but includes provisions that some commentators interpret as 
prohibiting or limiting such requirements.8 Whether or not this interpretation is 
correct is open to discussion.9 The World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute 
between the United States and Brazil that concerned a working requirement was 
settled, and therefore the case, which could have clarified whether the requirements 
comply with the TRIPS Agreement, produced no binding opinion on the issue.10 
This Article argues that to the extent that international obligations do not 
currently prevent, or will not prevent in the future, countries from introducing and 
maintaining patent working requirements, countries should use the requirements 
where necessary and appropriate to calibrate their national patent systems to best 
serve their needs. Needs, in this context, are not only the economic and social needs 
of individual countries, which certainly shape the goals pursued in national patent 
laws; access to medicines, for example, and other policy goals might be of greater 
concern in some countries more than in others. It is upon individual countries to 
defend their interests when they negotiate and enter into international obligations.11 
Other needs include the structural needs of countries’ legal systems; one legal 
system might operate with an internal consistency that requires certain components 
of the patent system to be shaped in one particular manner to achieve the goals of 
the system, while the same components might be ineffective or superfluous for the 
achievement of the same goals in another national legal system. Therefore, some 
countries might address the nonworking of patents by employing different 
components of their legal systems, while other countries, also to address the 
nonworking of patents—and to avoid a substantial overhaul of their legal systems—
might rely on working requirements to achieve the same end. 
This Article begins first with an overview of the history of patent working 
requirements, highlighting the features of their developments in the national laws 
of various countries and also in international patent law negotiations. Second, this 
Article discusses the goals that patent working requirements were designed to 
achieve; these goals have changed over time as countries rearrange the priorities of 
their goals. Third, this Article analyzes the relationships between patent working 
requirements and other components of national patent systems, and the interactions 
of the patent working requirement with these other components. 
 
8. NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 198 (2d ed. 2005). 
9. See Max Planck Inst. for Innovation & Competition, DECLARATION ON PATENT 
PROTECTION: REGULATORY SOVEREIGNTY UNDER TRIPS 9–10, https://www.mpg.de/8132986/
Patent-Declaration.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2015). 
10. Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent 
Protection, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/1 ( June 8, 2000). 
11. Whether countries actually can influence the result of international negotiations is a separate 
question; many factors can determine or influence a country’s ability to defend its economic and social 
needs in negotiations of international instruments on intellectual property law. 
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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The first working requirements implemented by countries were consistent 
with the countries’ initial approaches to their patent systems, which were guided by 
the notion that patents were expected to serve domestic industry.12 This notion led 
some countries to discriminate against foreigners, for example, by denying them the 
possibility to obtain patents. For instance, in the United States, there was a period 
of time in which foreigners could not obtain a U.S. patent at all, or only with 
difficulties.13 
The practice of denying patents to foreigners largely began to disappear 
starting in the mid-1800s; the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (“the Convention”)14 introduced the principle of national treatment, and 
the 1911 revision of the Convention prohibited countries from requiring foreign 
patentees to establish residence in a country as a condition of a patent grant by that 
country.15 Nevertheless, many countries continue, as a remnant of the old practice, 
to maintain provisions in their patent laws that show their preferences for patent 
applicants to first file for a patent locally.16 
The interest in promoting domestic industry also prompted countries to 
impose a working requirement to ensure that the patented invention was practiced 
locally. A patent owner who failed to work his patent in the country that granted 
 
12. A German author commented on the English view of patent law in 1839: “England 
justifiably views its patent law as a guarantee that no invention . . . will be lost for the country, but 
instead it must contribute—and with all potential of which it is able—to the welfare and progress of 
the domestic industry. In the recent years . . . progressive governments have adopted the same 
opinion.” FRIEDRICH GEORG WIECK, GRUNDSÄTZE DES PATENTWESENS 6 (1839) (translation by 
author). For the similar motivations of the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, see Camilla A. Hrdy, State 
Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez-Faire, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 98 (2013). 
13. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318, 321 (1793) (repealed 1836). Starting in 
1800, however, patents could be granted to “[a]liens who at the time of petitioning . . . [for a patent] 
resided for two years within the United States.” Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 1, 2 Stat. 37, 38 (1800) 
(repealed 1836). The Act of 1832 also permitted an alien to petition for a patent if “[a]t the time of 
petitioning for a patent, [the alien] shall be resident in the United States, and shall have declared his 
intention, according to law, to become a citizen thereof.” Act of July 13, 1832, ch. 203, 4 Stat. 577, 577 
(1832) (repealed 1836). In 1836, Congress repealed all previous patent laws, removing the limitations. 
Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, §§ 6, 21, 5 Stat. 117, 119, 125 (1836) (repealing ch. 11, Act of Feb. 21, 1793; 
ch. 25, Act of Apr. 17, 1800; ch. 203, Act of July 13, 1832) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-329 (1952)); see 
also ALBERT HENRY WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 591, 597, 601, 604–05 (4th ed. 1904). 
14. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1629, 
828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
15. Id. art. 2(2); GEORG HENDRIK CHRISTIAAN BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE 
APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AS 
REVISED AT STOCKHOLM IN 1967, at 31 (WIPO 2007). 
16. Countries differ in their requirements of patent applicants to first apply locally for  
patents based on the type of invention and the circumstances of the patent application. See, e.g., 35 
U.S.C. § 184(a) (2012); Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 
Amending the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009), art. 20, 2008  
Falü Huibian, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2011-02/15/content_1620619.htm [https://
perma.cc/8H74-Q2BE]; Patents Act 1977, c. 37, § 23 (UK). 
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the patent faced a forfeiture of the patent, or later, when forfeiture was replaced by 
compulsory licensing, a compulsory license for the patent.17 Working requirements 
that were a manifestation of countries’ concerns for their domestic industry and also 
a manifestation of the other goals of their national patent systems proved to be 
much more durable than the provisions that denied patents to foreigners. The 
working requirements, albeit with amendments, survived the Convention and its 
several revisions and exist in many countries to this day. 
The working requirement concept predates modern patent systems and 
originates in the medieval privileges—royal patents that sometimes granted 
privileges to foreigners who would teach their art to the country’s population. For 
example, in a patent that Edward III granted in 1331 to Johannes Kempe from 
Flanders, “the King promised similar privileges to all others who would settle in 
Great Britain and Ireland, and teach their arts to those willing to learn.”18 It was 
important for countries to see their local populations learn from the patent holder; 
even if the patent holder left the country after the patent expired, the country could 
continue to benefit from the newly acquired knowledge and skill.19 Later patents 
provide evidence that the requirement was maintained, but also that it developed 
over time:20 late sixteenth century English patents included a threat of invalidation 
if the patent was not practiced, and an English patent from 1639 included a 
requirement—notably consistent with later formulations of the working 
requirement—that the patent be worked within three years, otherwise it would be 
invalidated.21 
After modern national patent systems had been created to protect inventions, 
many of the systems imposed various versions of the working requirement at 
different times. For example, U.S. law never required that U.S. nationals work their 
patents, but for a short period of time from 1832 to 1836 the U.S. Patent Act did 
include a working requirement for patent owners who were foreigners.22 Later, 
when the existence of a patent working requirement was questioned in the context 
 
17. See, e.g., Oesterreichisches Patentgesetz 1852 [Austrian Patent Act of 1852] 
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL] § 3, reprinted in 1 BENJAMIN VAUGHAN ABBOTT, THE PATENT LAWS 
OF ALL NATIONS: ALGERIA—TURKEY 15, 16 (Washington, Charles R. Brodix 1886) [hereinafter 
PATENT LAWS OF ALL NATIONS]; Octrooiwet [Patent Act] of May 24, 1854, BELGISCH STAATSBLAD 
[B.S.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], May 25, 1854, art. XXIII, reprinted in PATENT LAWS OF ALL 
NATIONS at 46 [hereinafter Patent Act of Belgium]; Loi du 5 juillet 1844 sur les brevets d’invention 
[Law of July 5, 1844 on Patents for Inventions], PÉRIODIQUE ET CRITIQUE [D.P. III], July 5, 1844, 
art. 32(2) (Fr.), reprinted in PATENT LAWS OF ALL NATIONS at 190. 
18. ERNEST LUNGE, COMPULSORY WORKING AND REVOCATION OF PATENTS 2 (1910). 
19. Id. at 5. 
20. PENROSE, supra note 2, at 2–3, 9, 138–39. 
21. STEPHEN VAN DULKEN, BRITISH PATENTS OF INVENTION, 1617–1977: A GUIDE FOR 
RESEARCHERS 41 (The British Library, 1999). For other early examples of working requirements, see 
Frank I. Schechter, Would Compulsory Licensing of Patents Be Unconstitutional?, 22 VA. L. REV. 287, 
299–304 (1936); Vonneuman, supra note 1, at 397–98, 401. 
22. Act of July 13, 1832, ch. 203, 4 Stat. 577 (1832) (repealed 1836); see also Golden, supra note 
6, at 2123 n.50. For attempts to reintroduce the working requirement for foreign patent owners, see  
S. 1838, 67th Cong. (1921); S. 3325, 67th Cong. (1922). 
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of equitable considerations, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1908 confirmed that no 
patent working requirement had existed in U.S. law since 1836. The Court 
concluded that Congress knew of working requirements that existed in other 
countries and consciously opted to adopt and maintain a different policy.23 
Repeated attempts thereafter failed to introduce a general scheme for compulsory 
licensing into U.S. patent law for nonworking.24 In 1988, Congress confirmed that 
a refusal to license or use rights to a patent is not grounds for the denial of relief to 
a patent owner for infringement; such a refusal is not sufficient to deem the refusal 
an instance of patent misuse.25 While some components of the current U.S. patent 
system encourage patent working,26 and provisions do exist for a limited 
compulsory licensing of patents,27 the U.S. patent system does not include a general 
patent working requirement per se.28 
Given the original rationale for the working requirement, it is not surprising 
that countries initially did not permit the working requirement to be satisfied 
through an importation of goods.  Instead, the working requirement mandated the 
manufacturing of the goods in the country that granted the patent.29 But countries 
relaxed their approach to importation as it became clear that not all patented 
inventions could be—practicably or economically—manufactured locally. A 
number of countries introduced a system of importation patents that permitted a 
patent owner to import patented inventions from another country where the owner 
 
23. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908). On the “right not 
to use” in general and the Continental Paper Bag decision in particular, see Liivak & Peñalver, supra 
note 6, at 1444. 
24. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. U.S., 323 U.S. 386, 433 n.26, 433 n.27, clarified in 324 U.S. 570 
(1945); Armin Herz, Compulsory Licensing, 28 J. PATENT OFFICE SOC’Y 889 (1946); OLDFIELD, supra 
note 4; Schechter, supra note 21, at 288–91. For examples of U.S. bills that included a working 
requirement, see H.R. 9304, 81st Cong. (1950); S. 2491, 77th Cong. (1942); H.R. 6864, 75th  
Cong. (1937); S. 3474, 69th Cong. (1926); S. 3297, 67th Cong. (1922); S. 1838, 67th Cong. (1921) 
(foreign-owned patents); H.R. 19188, 63d Cong. (1914); H.R. 1700, 63d Cong. § 1 (1913); H.R. 23193, 
62d Cong. § 17 (1912). 
25. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012); see also Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547–48, 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (discussing patents in exchange for disclosure rather than use). 
26. U.S. law includes some provisions that incentivize patent working and de facto sanction 
non-working. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) (2012); In the Matter of Certain Multimedia Display  
and Navigation Devices and Sys., Components Thereof, and Prods. Containing Same, ITC, 337-TA- 
694, July 22, 2011; Certain Optical Disc Drives, Components Thereof, & Prods. Containing Same, 
ITC, 337-TA-897, July 17, 2014. For patent working in considerations of equitable remedies, see Foster 
v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974). 
27. 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2012); 22 U.S.C. § 2572 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 203 
(2012) (march-in rights); 35 U.S.C. § 204 (2012) (preference for U.S. industry); 35 U.S.C. § 209(b) (2012) 
(manufacture in the United States of licensed federally-owned inventions); Clean Air Amendments of 
1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(h)(6) (1970) (transferred to 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2012)); Atomic Energy Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2183 (2012); 50 U.S.C. § 167 (2012). 
28. Two examples of post-1988 bills with working requirements are H.R. 4151, 103d  
Cong. (1994) (for patents “of vital importance to the public health or welfare . . .”); H.R. 2927, 106th 
Cong. (1999) (for patents that are necessary to “alleviate health or safety needs”). 
29. Patent Act of Belgium, supra note 17, 38 fol., at 41.  
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held a patent on the same invention;30 some of these countries issued these 
importation patents only for inventions that were considered deserving of special 
treatment because of the patented inventions’ importance.31 Later, some countries 
entered into agreements that enlarged the territorial scope for patent working. Based 
on these agreements, working in any of the countries-parties to an agreement 
satisfied the working requirement in all the countries, which sometimes, although 
not always, led to the importation of an invention from one of the countries into 
another.32 And eventually, most countries recognized that the working requirement 
could be satisfied through importation.33 
From the beginnings of international negotiations on industrial property 
protection, working requirements were a hotly debated topic, and international 
negotiations turned to the appropriate remedy (vis-à-vis society) or sanction (vis-à-
vis the patent owner) for the nonworking of a patent. While at the 1873 Vienna 
Conference the discussions concerned compulsory licensing as a remedy,34 at the 
1878 Paris Conference the discussions turned away from compulsory licensing—
apparently because of the influence of the French delegation, which insisted that 
compulsory licensing was contrary to the natural rights theory on which French 
patent law had been built.35 Because compulsory licensing (imposed for any reason) 
was interpreted as a potential violation of the absolute right to property that should 
be enjoyed by the patent owner,36 expropriation of a patent in the public interest 
was instead promoted as the only acceptable remedy in light of the theory.37 
When the Paris Convention was signed in 1883, it stated that “the patentee 
[was to] remain bound to work his patent in conformity with the laws of the country 
into which he introduces the patented objects.”38 As for importation, the 
Convention prohibited forfeiture as the sanction for the importation of a patented 
invention, as long as the invention was manufactured in a country of the Paris Union 
 
30. See PATENT LAWS OF ALL NATIONS, supra note 17, fol. 139 at 140–41. A similar provision 
was included in the 1853 Patent Regulation of Sachsen but only in relation to the other states of the 
German Union. Importation patents survived the Paris Convention, and in the 1970s, there were still 
several countries that granted importation patents. See LADAS, supra note 1, at 375–77. 
31. For instance, section 2 of the Patent Act of Bayern made it a condition for granting an 
importation patent that the invention has “a generally beneficial impact.” EDUARD STOLLE, DIE 
EINHEIMISCHE UND AUSLÄNDISCHE PATENTGESETZGEBUNG ZUM SHUTZE GEWERBLICHER 
ERFINDUNGEN 27 (1855).  
32. See infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
33. Some national laws continued to show the countries’ preference for local manufacturing. 
See, e.g., Patents Act 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6 c. 87, § 37 (UK) (allowing for a compulsory license, 
 i.e. when the demand for a patented invention was met only through importation); see also infra notes 
82–86, 97, 98 and accompanying text for developments in the United Kingdom, India, and Brazil. 
34. THOMAS WEBSTER, CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DES BREVETS D’INVENTION TENU À 
L’EXPOSITION UNIVERSELLE DE VIENNE EN 1873 58–61 (1877). 
35. PENROSE, supra note 2, at 51–52. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Paris Convention art. 5(A)(2), 1883. 
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(a party to the Paris Convention);39 however, the Convention did not address the 
question whether importation satisfied national working requirements. 
The acknowledgment in the Paris Convention of the existence of national 
working requirements was not without its opponents; even before the Convention 
was signed in 1883, four countries opposed the provision.40 A few countries sought 
to enlarge the territorial scope of the working that was required: at the 1886 Rome 
Conference, Belgium and Italy proposed that a working in one of the countries of 
the Paris Union should satisfy any working requirements that the national laws of 
any of the countries imposed,41 and at the 1890 Madrid Conference, the United 
States again introduced the proposal.42 Other countries advanced their own visions 
for amendments to the Convention with regard to working requirements. France, 
which at the time did not permit its working requirement to be satisfied by 
importation, proposed in 1886 that the Convention be amended to allow countries 
to prohibit importation.43 At the 1890 Madrid Conference, Sweden and Norway 
proposed that compulsory licensing be introduced as the remedy for nonworking.44 
Ultimately, in the Final Protocol to the 1900 Brussels Revision of the Convention, 
the signatory countries agreed that a forfeiture for nonworking could not occur 
before three years from the filing of a patent application and could occur only if a 
patent owner could not justify the nonworking.45 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, working requirements were perhaps 
the most contentious issue of international patent law negotiations. While some 
countries seemed at that time to be relaxing their working requirements, the United 
Kingdom tightened its working requirement in 1902 by allowing the revocation of 
a patent for nonworking not only if “[t]he patent [was] not being worked in the 
United Kingdom,”46 but also “[i]f . . . the patent [was] worked . . . exclusively or 
mainly, outside the United Kingdom,”47 and a 1907 amendment simplified the 
procedure for the revocation of a patent.48 The amendments attracted harsh 
 
39. Paris Convention art. 5(A)(1), 1883. 
40. The countries were Belgium, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Turkey. PENROSE, supra 
note 2, at 79; LADAS, supra note 1, at 519. 
41. PENROSE, supra note 2, at 79–81. 
42. Id. at 81. 
43. Id. at 76. 
44. Id. at 81. 
45. Paris Convention, as revised at Brussels on Dec. 14, 1990. 
46. Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, 46 & 47 VICT. c. 57 § 22(a). 
47. Patents Act, 1902, 2 Edw. 7 c. 34 art. 3 (amending § 22(5) of the Patents, Designs, and Trade 
Marks Act, 1883) (emphasis added); see Marks & Clerk, ATTORNEY’S MANUAL ON BRITISH AND 
FOREIGN PATENTS AND TRADE MARKS 14–416 (1910) (providing additional information about 
Patents Act, 1902). 
48. A commentator in 1908 estimated that “[p]ossibly, because of the cheaper procedure under 
the present [1907] Act and the new grounds upon which the reasonable requirements of the public are 
to be deemed not to have been satisfied, applications for compulsory licenses may be more frequent in 
the future than they have been in the past.” ROBERT FROST, PATENTS AND DESIGNS ACT, 1907: 7 
EDW. 7, C. 29. WITH AN APPENDIX OF THE RULES, FORMS, FEES, AND CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS 
UNDER THE ACT, TOGETHER WITH THE PATENTS AND DESIGNS (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1907, AND 
EXTRACTS FROM THE INTERPRETATION ACT, 1899 43 (3d ed. 1908). 
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criticism.49 One contemporary commentator charged that “[t]he 1907 Act 
fundamentally altered the nature of the modern British patent and threw it back into 
the legal condition of British patents as granted by Elizabeth and the Stuarts.”50 
The adoption of the 1902 and 1907 British statutes was prompted primarily 
by concerns about the influence of the German chemical industry in the United 
Kingdom and its monopolization of an entire industrial sector in the United 
Kingdom.51 In a 1904 judgment in a case concerning chemical inventions, a  
judge of the High Court of Justice rejected the notion that the nonworking of a 
U.K. patent in the United Kingdom could lead to the revocation of a patent.52 The 
judge suggested that the arguments presented by the defendant in the case would 
have been “more properly . . . adduced in another place where the law may be 
made.”53 When Parliament later debated the 1907 amendment to the Patents Act 
concerning working requirements, members of Parliament noticed that almost half 
of British patents issued in 1906 were granted to foreigners.54 
The 1902 and 1907 amendments did not produce the desired results. 
Applications for patent revocations were indeed filed under the 1907 law, but the 
applications did not bring the effect on German chemical companies that the 
amendments intended.55 The U.K. law prompted German companies to purchase 
chemical plants in the United Kingdom, and the companies did not suffer mass 
revocations of their U.K. chemical patents.56 An unintended result was that in 
response to the U.K. approach, Germany amended its own patent working 
requirement in 1911; instead of the revocation of a patent only in a case of 
nonworking (which the law had provided for since 1877),57 the newly worded 
provision adopted the wording of the U.K. Patents Act, imposing revocation if the 
“invention [was] worked exclusively or primarily outside of the German 
Reich . . . .”58 
 
49. Patents and Designs Act, 1907, 7 Edw. c. 29 § 24. 
50. LUNGE, supra note 18, at 28. 
51. KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE: REASSERTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST 232–33 (Leonardo 
Burlamaqui et al. eds., 2014). 
52. Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. W. G. Thompson & Co., Ld. [1904] EWHC (Eng.), 
reprinted in REPORTS OF PATENT, DESIGN AND TRADEMARK CASES 21(20), 473, 479 (Intellectual  
Prop. Office 1904). 
53. Id. 
54. PENROSE, supra note 2, at 140. In 1906, a total of 14,707 U.K. patents were granted, of 
which 6,503 were granted to foreigners; of that latter number, 2,091 were granted to German applicants. 
MARKS & CLERK, ATTORNEY’S MANUAL ON BRITISH AND FOREIGN PATENTS AND TRADE MARKS 
17 (1910). 
55. In 1909, the Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks reported that 55 
applications were filed that year for “the revocation of patents worked exclusively or mainly outside 
the United Kingdom.” REP. OF THE COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE 
MARKS 9 (1909). According to the statistics from that year, 27 applications were “subsequently 
abandoned” and 11 applications resulted in the revocation of the patent. Id. 
56. Vaughan, supra note 4, at 693, 696, 600. 
57. Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], May 25, 1877, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL] at § 184 
(Ger.). 
58. Patent Act, 1911, Article 11(2) (emphasis added). 
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The German chemical industry lobbied heavily for a complete abolition of 
working requirements both in Germany and abroad. The industry sought to 
eliminate working requirements in Germany, and Germany, in an attempt to 
mitigate the impact of the requirements in other countries, concluded a series of 
bilateral treaties with the United States, Greece, Switzerland, and Austria.59 These 
treaties enlarged the territorial scope of patent working that would satisfy national 
working requirements; for example, a 1909 agreement between Germany and the 
United States stated that “[t]he working of a patent . . . in the territory of one of the 
Contracting Parties shall be considered as equivalent to its working in the territory 
of the other Party.”60 This agreement was concluded at a time when the percentage 
of U.S. patents granted to foreign applicants, and in particular to German applicants, 
was rising. Of the U.S. patents issued in 1900–1910, 11.3% were granted to foreign 
applicants, and of those, 25% were granted to German applicants.61 In 1910–1915, 
the latter percentage rose to 33%, and most of the German applicants were in the 
chemical industry.62 Most importantly, in cases of certain types of chemical 
inventions, German companies owned more than 90% of the patents issued on 
those types of inventions.63 
During the 1911 Washington Conference, Germany and the United States 
both argued in favor of abolishing working requirements.64 However, the idea of a 
complete abolition of the requirement did not enjoy sufficient support among the 
other national delegations; the 1911 revision of the Convention restated the 1900 
Final Protocol rule that working requirements could result in forfeiture only after 
three years from the date of the filing of the patent application, and only then in the 
absence of a justification that would excuse a nonworking.65 
During the 1925 Hague Conference, only three countries opposed  
the abolishment of the working requirement.66 The resulting Convention  
text recognized countries’ rights “to take necessary legislative measures to 
prevent . . . abuses” of patent rights, with “failure to work” being listed as the only 
example of such abuses.67 The text also expressed a preference for compulsory 
licensing as opposed to forfeiture, as long as a compulsory license would suffice to 
 
59. JAN VOJÁČEK, A SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL NATIONAL PATENT SYSTEMS 63 (1936); e.g., 
Übereinkomment zwischen der Schweiz und Deutschland betreffend den gegenseitigen Patent-, 
Muster- und Markenschutz [Agreement between Switzerland and Germany concerning the mutual 
protection of patents, designs and trademarks] [Switz-Ger.], Apr. 13, 1892, RGBL at art. 5 (Ger.); 
Patents Convention, U.S-Ger., at 1:578, Feb. 23, 1909, 36 Stat. 2178 [hereinafter Patents Convention]. 
60. Patents Convention, supra note 59. 
61. Vaughan, supra note 4, at 697. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. PENROSE, supra note 2, at 82. 
65. Paris Convention, as revised at Washington on June 2, 1911, art. 5(A)(2), 1911. 
66. The countries were Japan, Poland, and Yugoslavia. PENROSE, supra note 2, at 84. 
67. Paris Convention, as revised at the Hague on Nov. 6, 1925, art. 5(A)(2); see also PIRES DE 
CARVALHO, supra note 8, at 163 (critiquing proposals to declare non-working an instance of patent 
abuse). 
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prevent abuses of patent rights,68 and the text maintained in the Convention the 
three-year period and justification through legitimate excuse.69 
The 1934 London Conference added a provision stating that the “proceedings 
for the forfeiture or revocation of a patent may be instituted before the expiration 
of two years from the grant of the first compulsory license.”70 The 1958 Lisbon 
Conference set a period after which a compulsory license may be requested to “four 
years from the filing of the patent application or three years from the date of the 
grant of the patent, whichever period last expires.”71 The 1958 text also specified 
that the compulsory license would be non-exclusive and non-transferrable.72 The 
1958 language concerning patent working requirements remains the current 
language of the Convention. The 1967 Stockholm Conference extended the 
applicability of the provisions concerning working requirements to utility models 
but other than this extension introduced no changes to the provisions concerning 
working requirements.73 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, developing countries pursued a proposal to 
amend the provisions of the Convention with regard to working requirements; the 
proposal would have allowed stricter national working requirements.74 Their 
proposal included a provision according to which importation would not satisfy the 
working requirement,75 and a provision allowing sanctions other than compulsory 
licenses to be imposed for nonworking.76 The proposal would have also allowed 
developing countries to shorten the period for revoking a patent for nonworking77 
and to issue exclusive compulsory licenses.78 The parties to the Convention 
contested the proposal,79 and the disagreement over the proposal was one of the 
reasons that this revision of the Convention was not adopted.80 
In 1992, the working requirements of two European countries, Italy and the 
United Kingdom, were subject to scrutiny by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities when the Court assessed the compatibility of their working 
 
68. Paris Convention, as revised at the Hague on Nov. 6, 1925, art. 5(A)(3). 
69. Paris Convention, as revised at the Hague on Nov. 6, 1925, art. 5(A)(4). 
70. Paris Convention, as revised at London on June 2, 1934, art. 5(A)(4). 
71. Paris Convention, as revised at Lisbon on Oct. 31, 1958, art. 5A(4). 
72. Id. 
73. Paris Convention, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, art. 5(A)(5). 
74. Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 1, at 234. 
75. Draft Text of Basic Proposal for Paris Convention art. 5A(1)(b), reprinted in Paul S. Haar, 
Revision of the Paris Convention: A Realignment of Private and Public Interests in the International Patent 
System, 8 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 77, 107 (1982) [hereinafter Draft Text]. 
76. Id. at art. 5(A)(1). 
77. Adrienne Catanese, Paris Convention, Patent Protection, and Technology Transfer, 3 B.U. INT’L 
L. J. 209, 221 (1985). 
78. Id. at 219. 
79. Id. at 218–22. 
80. Id. at 218; see Fenton Hay, Canada’s Role in International Negotiations Concerning Intellectual 
Property Laws, 8 RES. IN L. AND ECON. 239, 251–56 (providing a detailed description of the eight-year 
negotiations, including the Nairobi Session). 
Trimble_First to Printer (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2017  11:37 AM 
2016] PATENT WORKING REQUIREMENTS 495 
requirements with European Economic Community law.81 The Commission of the 
European Communities had brought the first of the two cases against Italy in 1989 
and the second case against the United Kingdom in 1990, claiming that the Italian 
and U.K. working requirements82 violated Article 30 of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Economic Community,83 which prohibited (and which the equivalent 
current provision in the European Union still prohibits) “[q]uantitative restrictions 
on importation and all measures with equivalent effect.”84 The Court of Justice held 
that the working requirement in the Italian and U.K. patent statutes violated Article 
30;85 the Court rejected arguments put forth in defense of the requirements, 
including the argument that “the objection to the provisions in question [was] 
essentially academic since in practice they [were] seldom applied.”86 
Indeed, the incidence of enforcement of patent working requirements has 
typically been reported as low. This low incidence might exist for two reasons: First, 
patents that are economically valuable—patents that are of sufficient economic 
importance to warrant an attack by competitors for nonworking—are typically not 
the patents that are not worked, and if valuable patents are not worked, the reason 
for the nonworking might often excuse the nonworking. Second, many countries 
have accepted nominal working as sufficient to satisfy the requirement; for example, 
in some countries, isolated advertisements were found to satisfy the requirement 
when those advertisements were placed in industry magazines and the 
advertisements offered to grant licenses to anyone interested.87 The voluntary 
“license of right” mechanism introduced in some countries helps patent owners 
comply with the working requirement;88 a patent owner may request that its patent 
be designated as “license of right,” meaning that the patent is available to anyone 
by license, and such a designation protects the patent owner from being attacked 
for nonworking.89 
 
81. See Case C-235/89, Comm’n v. Italian Republic, 1992 E.C.R. I-777; Case C-30/90, Comm’n 
v. U. K., 1992 E.C.R. I-829. 
82. Royal Decree No. 1127 of 29 June 1939, as amended by Decree No. 849 of 26 February 
1968, art. 52; U.K. Patents Act, 1977, s. 48. 
83. See Case C-235/89, Comm’n v. Italian Republic, 1992 E.C.R. I-777; Case C-30/90, Comm’n 
v. U. K., 1992 E.C.R. I-829. 
84. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 34, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11; see also Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, 1973. 
85. See Case C-235/89, Comm’n v. Italian Republic, 1992 E.C.R. I-777; Case C-30/90, Comm’n 
v. U. K., 1992 E.C.R. I-829. 
86. Comm’n v. U. K., 1992 E.C.R. I-829 at ¶ 15; see Mark Hodgson, Changes to UK Compulsory 
Patent Licensing Laws, 14(6) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 214 (1992) (illustrating developments leading 
to the case against the United Kingdom). 
87. PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 98:17 (Henry D. Teegarden ed., 4th ed. 2015). 
88. See infra note 160; Patents Act 1949, 12, 13, & 14 Geo. 6, c. 87 § 37 (UK) (demonstrating 
that involuntary mechanisms described as “licenses of right” may also exist); see also Robert Miller, 
TERRELL ON THE LAW OF PATENTS ch. 17 §§ 17-23 (17th ed. 2010) (providing commentary on 
involuntary “licenses of right” in the United Kingdom). 
89. See infra note 166. 
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The TRIPS Agreement does not include provisions that specifically address 
working requirements,90 but some commentators have suggested that some of its 
provisions do affect working requirements, specifically, the provisions that prohibit 
discrimination based on the place of invention and based on whether the invention 
is manufactured locally or is imported.91 Some commentators have argued that 
patent working requirements violate the TRIPS Agreement;92 other commentators 
have inferred from the Agreement that countries must accept importation as 
satisfying the working requirement.93 No binding interpretation of the TRIPS 
Agreement exists that would shed light on the status of working requirements post-
TRIPS. The single WTO dispute that concerned the requirements—a dispute 
between the United States and Brazil—settled without producing a binding 
opinion.94 
Many countries today maintain a patent working requirement in some form.95 
Countries typically accept importation as a form of patent working. In India, the 
question of importation was recently before its courts, and the Mumbai Controller 
of Patents—in a decision concerning a compulsory license on a pharmaceutical 
patent—stated in 2012 that “the Paris Convention and TRIPS Agreement and 
[Indian] Patents Act, 1970 read together do not in any manner imply that working 
means importation.”96 However, this interpretation was rejected on appeal by the 
Intellectual Property Appellate Board in 2013, and the High Court of Judicature in 
the same year confirmed that “worked in India” does not have to “mean only 
manufactured in India.”97 In fact, the “patented invention [may] be worked in the 
 
90. For the history of the TRIPS negotiations with respect to working requirements, see Paul 
Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An 
Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 373–80 (2002). 
91. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7 at art. 27(1). 
92.  GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF 
TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 43 (Oxford 
2012). 
93. DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 433 
(4th ed. 2012); PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 8, at 81, 317. Cf. Cottier et al., supra note 1, at 460. For 
arguments that working requirements are in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, see Michael 
Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements and Compulsory Licenses at 
International Law, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243, 282 (1997); Bryan Mercurio & Mitali Tyagi, Treaty 
Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local Working 
Requirements, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 275, 275-76, 326 (2010); Champ & Attaran, supra note 90, at 367, 
393; DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 92, at 43–45. 
94. World Trade Organization, Brazil–Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WTO Doc. WT/
DS199/4, June 19, 2001. For a discussion of the aftermath of the dispute, see Monirul Azam, The 
Experiences of TRIPS-Compliant Patent Law Reforms in Brazil, India, and South Africa and Lessons for 
Bangladesh, 7 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 61, 69–70 (2014). 
95. Cottier et al., supra note 1. 
96. CONTROLLER OF PATENTS MUMBAI, In re Application for Compulsory License Under Section 
84(1) of the Patents Act, 1970 in Respect of Patent No. 215758, Application No. 1 of 2011 44–45 (Mar. 
9, 2012), http://www.hkindia.com/images/compulsory.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NRH-ZK7A]. 
97. Bayer v. Union of India [High Court of Judicature at Bombay] Writ Petition No. 1323 of 
2013 ( July 15, 2014), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/28519340/ [https://perma.cc/5KSW-
Z6YB]. The decision of the Controller (the compulsory license) was upheld, and the Supreme Court 
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territory of India by manufacture or otherwise.”98 Article 68 of the Brazilian Patent 
Act that the United States challenged before the WTO does not recognize 
importation as a form of working; the Act permits others to import the invention 
into Brazil if the patent owner only imports the invention into Brazil, but does not 
manufacture it in there.99 
II. GOALS OF WORKING REQUIREMENTS 
As the historical overview above suggests, patent working requirements were 
designed to accomplish various goals in different countries at different times. All of 
these goals can be subsumed under a single heading: “access.” All of the goals strive 
to provide access to a desired commodity—an entire field of technology, a skill, 
information about an invention, and/or a patented invention itself—in the country 
that granted the patent. What has changed throughout the decades is what the 
particular commodities are that countries consider desirable and what actions have 
been considered necessary to achieve effective access to the commodities. 
Inevitably, particular circumstances and needs in individual countries have shaped 
the specific goals that the countries pursue with their working requirements. 
In the earliest days of patents, countries wanted to attract foreign artisans who 
possessed skills and knowledge that were not available to the local population; these 
foreign artisans were expected to teach their art locally.100 The function of the patent 
holder as a “teacher of the nation”101 was reflected in the patent term, which was 
based on a typical seven-year apprenticeship term.102 During this stage of 
development, it would have been ineffective for countries to rely on the other types 
of disclosures that the later patent systems introduced in the form of claims, 
descriptions, and specifications because even a detailed written disclosure would 
have been insufficient to enable anyone in the country to practice the disclosed 
invention without being taught the basics of the art by the patent holder. The 
imported art required new types of skills completely unknown to the local 
population.103 
The patents that were originally granted by countries introduced an entire or 
substantial part of a field of industry to a country,104 helped develop the skills and 
 
of India dismissed the special leave petition in the case. Bayer v. Union of India [Supreme Court of 
India] petition for special leave to appeal No. 30145/2014 (Dec. 12, 2014). 
98. Id. (emphasis added); see also Emmanuel Kolawole Oke, Can Importation Satisfy Local 
Working Requirements?, 37(5) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 278 (2015). 
99. Law No. 9,279, of May 14, 1996, Article 68(3) & (4) (Braz.). 
100. See LUNGE, supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
101. FELIX DAMME, DAS DEUTSCHE PATENTRECHT 8 (1906). 
102. Id. 
103. Carlo Marco Belfanti, Guilds, Patents, and the Circulation of Technical Knowledge, 45 TECH. & 
CULTURE 569, 578 (2004) (“[P]atents were mainly used to reward craftsmen who introduced processes 
or products unknown in the local context and who, for precisely that reason, rarely entered into conflict 
with the city craft guilds.”). 
104. Id. at 570–71, 588–89. 
Trimble_First to Printer (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2017  11:37 AM 
498 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:483 
knowledge of the local population,105 and produced local benefits even after the 
patent holder had left the country or otherwise ceased to practice the patent.106 Mere 
importation of a patented invention would not have produced all these benefits, 
and compulsory licensing would have been an insufficient penalty for nonworking 
because there would have been no one in the country to practice the invention, 
unless there was a competing foreign artisan present. Revocation of the patent 
under the old patent systems allowed for the possibility of granting the patent to 
someone else who could utilize and benefit from the monopoly. After the modern 
patent systems for inventions made novelty an explicit requirement, revocation of 
the patent could not be followed by a new patent grant on the same invention, but 
the revocation would lower the cost of entry into the market to attract persons who 
could then practice the invention in the country.107 
Modern patent systems replaced the working of a patent for the purposes of 
transfer of information with other forms of disclosure that were sufficient to meet 
the informational goal.108 In the United Kingdom in the eighteenth century, “the 
requirement of compulsory working dropped into desuetude and its place was taken 
for all practical purposes, in particular in the practice of the law courts, by . . . [the 
full disclosure] requirement.”109 Disclosure through actual working became less 
important for two reasons. First, patents began to be granted on inventions that did 
not represent an entirely new area of art;110 the inventions were incremental 
additions to existing art that was already developed in the country or that could have 
been developed based on knowledge already available in the country. Therefore, a 
detailed disclosure in a patent application became sufficient for teaching the 
invention to local industry. Second, patent systems developed sufficiently detailed 
requirements for the content of patent applications so that the applications 
sufficiently disclosed (or should have sufficiently disclosed) the information 
necessary for relevant persons to learn the invention.111 
Even after the modern patent systems changed to paper disclosure, remnants 
of working requirements sometimes remained and contributed to the sufficiency of 
 
105. Id.; see also LUNGE, supra note 18, at 3. 
106. Id. 
107. See LUNGE, supra note 18, at 27. 
108. As Herbert Hovenkamp points out, the fact that disclosure was secured through other 
means did not render working requirements superfluous from the perspective of other goals: “Patent 
disclosure and enablement are intended to facilitate copying of the innovation by others after a patent 
expires. Nonuse during the patent period can still result in removal of the technology from the market 
for the duration of the patent’s life.” Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent 
Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 22 (2016). 
109. LUNGE, supra note 18, at 14; see also PENROSE, supra note 2, at 138; Mario Biagioli, Patent 
Republic: Representing Inventions, Constructing Rights and Authors, 73 SOC. RES. 1129, 1135 (2006) 
(“What changed radically between 1594 and 1790 were not just the standards of patent descriptions but 
what those descriptions were for.”). 
110. LUNGE, supra note 18, at 15–16. 
111. Id. at 16–17. 
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disclosure. In the United States, the requirements of enablement and best mode112 
evidenced a desire for patent applicants to disclose information important for the 
actual working of their patents.113 The actual working of an invention is one of the 
possible means of reduction to practice.114 The reduction to practice may mark the 
moment of invention, which for patent applications filed before the effective date 
of the America Invents Act115 constituted the priority date of inventions.116 
From an informational goal perspective, working requirements have also 
become less important because of the greater accessibility of patent applications 
published abroad. When cross-border exchanges of information were limited, local 
patent working was a means of learning about an invention that might have been 
available and/or described elsewhere but would have been de facto nonexistent for 
the local population, who could not access the information about the invention. 
Once sufficient disclosure exists in a country, or once information is accessible from 
other countries, the pressure for a working requirement diminishes to the extent 
that “the disclosure and information functions of the patent system [may be] . . . 
covered through the patent systems of the more technically advanced countries.”117 
Working requirements, when they required local manufacture, were designed 
to support the development of domestic industry. To satisfy the requirement, a 
patent owner had to build its own manufacturing capacity in the country, utilize 
existing capacity in the country, or license its invention to someone who could 
manufacture the invention locally. The requirement that the patented invention be 
manufactured in the country was also designed to positively impact employment in 
the country, since local workers would likely be employed to work the invention. A 
skilled labor force and a manufacturing capacity would be the legacy of the patent 
working that would benefit the country long after the patent had expired. 
The local manufacture rationale for working requirements remains valid in 
developing and least-developed countries. These countries are being asked to 
harmonize their patent laws with international standards in line with the theory that 
stronger patent protection in these countries will enhance the transfer of technology 
 
112. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012); ROBERT A. CLARKE, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE ch. 2100, § 2165 (9th ed. 2014),  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2165.html. 
113. See Hovenkamp, supra note 108, at 21–22. 
114. CLARKE, supra note 112, § 2138.05 (9th ed. 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
pac/mpep/s2138.html#d0e207753 [https://perma.cc/LQ67-4G24] (“For an actual reduction to 
practice, the invention must have been sufficiently tested to demonstrate that it will work for its 
intended purpose, but it need not be in a commercially satisfactory stage of development.” (citation 
omitted)). 
115. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (codified in 
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. (2011)) (changing the U.S. patent system to first-to-file as of Mar. 16, 
2013). 
116. For a proposal suggesting that an actual reduction to practice be required, see Christopher 
A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 120–22 (2009). 
117. Guillermo Cabanellas, The Consequences of Stricter Working Requirements for Patentees 
Under the Paris Convention, 19 I.I.C. 158, 162 (1988). 
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and know-how into these countries.118 However, such transfers will occur only if 
patented inventions are manufactured inside the country; importation alone will do 
little, if anything, to bring about any technology or know-how transfers.119 There 
are, of course, many reasons why patent owners might opt not to manufacture in a 
particular country—availability of patent protection is only one factor that patent 
owners might consider.120 But if a potential patent applicant plans to manufacture 
in a country, there seems to be no reason why the existence of a working 
requirement predicated on local manufacture should dissuade the applicant from 
applying for a patent and manufacturing in the country. If it is impossible, or if it 
makes no economic sense to manufacture in a country, presumably no one—
whether a patent owner or a competitor—will want to manufacture the invention 
in the country. In that case, even if a patent exists on the invention in the country, 
it is highly unlikely that anyone would challenge the nonworking of the patent, 
unless the patent owner only imports the patented invention into the country and 
uses the patent solely as an “exclusive import permit”121 that other potential 
importers will want to challenge. 
An important goal of the working requirement has been to secure access to a 
patented invention in the country that granted the patent, regardless of whether the 
invention is manufactured in the country or elsewhere.122 The goal has been not 
only for the population to be able to learn about the invention but also—or even 
primarily—for the population to benefit from the use of the invention. For 
example, countries want patented pharmaceutical inventions to be available locally 
during the patent term but do not necessarily want to develop their own 
pharmaceutical industries.123 The goal of securing access to the patented invention 
solely for the purposes of use may outweigh the other goals of the working 
requirement, such as the development of a domestic industry, with the result that 
importation will be a sufficient form of the working requirement to satisfy this 
particular goal. A country may also relinquish the prospect of local manufacturing 
 
118. Ashish Arora, Intellectual Property Rights and the International Transfer of Technology: Setting 
Out an Agenda for Empirical Research in Developing Countries, in THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 41, 41 (2009). 
119. Edith Penrose, International Patenting and the Less-Developed Countries, 83 ECON. J. 768, 
770 (1973). Penrose also noted that “very few of the foreign patents granted in less-developed countries 
are actually worked in the country granting them . . . . [I]t is often concluded that foreign patents serve 
primarily as exclusive import permits for the foreign producers.” Id. at 776. 
120. For the “reasons why a patentee may decide not to exploit its patent within a given 
country,” see Cabanellas, supra note 117, at 166–68. For historical examples of patent owners’ attraction 
to existing technology in a country of a patent, see Belfanti, supra note 103, at 581. 
121. See Penrose, supra note 119, at 776; see also Haar, supra note 75, at 93 (noting in Nairobi 
negotiations, least-developed countries “[p]erceive[d] nominal working as an effective transformation 
of patent grants into import permits impeding the transfer of technology and forestalling domestic 
research.” (footnote omitted)). 
122. See Halewood, supra note 93, at 246. 
123. Id. at 248. 
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if local manufacturing would result in higher prices for—and therefore de facto less 
access to—the patented invention in the country.124 
Another goal of patent working requirements is to prevent patent owners from 
creating blocking monopolies—from obtaining and maintaining patents for the 
purpose of blocking others from developing technologies in the vicinity of the 
patented inventions.125 In these instances a country already has its own industry that 
can secure access to inventions in the invention’s vicinity. However, the patent 
owner holds a key to the future development of the field of technology in the 
particular area. The problem could be created by a single patent owner, a patent 
pool, or otherwise linked patent owners who could effectively monopolize an area 
of technology and block access to the technology, thereby stifling the development 
of that technology in the country.126 An imposition of either forfeiture or 
compulsory licensing in a case of nonworking will result in the unblocking of access 
to the patented invention. Relying on patent owners to agree to the need to cross-
license complementary patents127 works only if competitors actually own 
complementary patents that the blocking patent owners need. 
Strategic considerations concerning the preservation or development of a 
certain field of technology might also influence countries’ approaches to patent 
working requirements. It was a concern about the development of the domestic 
chemical industry in the United Kingdom that led at the beginning of the twentieth 
century to the tightening of the patent working requirement in the United Kingdom 
at a time the U.K. government felt that German companies had begun to 
monopolize the U.K. chemical industry.128 A danger of monopolization might arise 
even if a technology is actually being developed in a country and there is no formal 
violation of a working requirement, but all of the industry is in the hands of a single 
set of companies or a set of linked companies—whether they be linked 
administratively, economically, politically, or otherwise. If the entirety of an industry 
is being developed in the country by a group of companies that collectively blocks 
or may block competitors and alternative industries, the country may be vulnerable, 
particularly in strategic industries.129 
 
124. See generally Frederick M. Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade 
and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317 (2005). 
125. These may be dependent patents. See Richard Reik, Compulsory Licensing of Patents, 36  
AM. ECON. REV. 813, 816–17 (1946). 
126. For examples of suppression of technology through patent non-use, see Kurt M. Saunders, 
Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 389, 406–17 (2002). For rationales that might lead to suppression through patent non-use, see 
id. at 417–26. 
127. Cabanellas, supra note 117, at 168. 
128. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
129. The Nairobi proposal from the 1980s for amending article 5(A) of the Paris Convention 
seemed to have targeted such circumstances; paragraph 5 of Article 5A would have allowed countries 
to expropriate patents—even if those patents were worked by their patent owners—if the expropriation 
was in the public interest. Haar, supra note 75, at 95. The proposed definition of “public interest” 
included “the development of other vital sectors of the national economy.” Id. at 96 (footnote omitted). 
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III. INTERACTION WITH OTHER COMPONENTS 
OF NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 
Patent working requirements are components of complex national legal 
systems and do not operate in isolation from the other components of the system; 
they interact with the other components, and the requirements are shaped in part 
by the needs of the entire system. This Section explores the links and interactions 
between working requirements and the other components of the system. 
As was noted above, patent working requirements interact with the 
requirement of disclosure. In the early days of patents, “requiring actual assembly 
in the country[ ]  help[ed] those in the industry better understand the product’s 
unique features.”130 History suggests that the more detailed is the requirement of 
sufficient disclosure in a patent application, the less is the need for a working 
requirement. Sufficient disclosure should satisfy the need for information about the 
invention, so that there is no need for addressees to actually witness the 
functioning—or at least the finished assembly—of the invention.131 As was 
suggested earlier, even with sufficient disclosure on paper, some remnants of the 
working requirements might survive in patent systems today to enhance disclosure. 
However, there should be no need to see an invention worked before or while it is 
patented in order for anyone ordinarily skilled in the art and equipped with 
sufficient infrastructure to be able to replicate the invention. 
Several commentators have noted that the current disclosure rules do not 
serve the purpose of sufficiently informing persons ordinarily skilled in the art about 
an invention.132 They argue that first, the high numbers of patents make the tracking 
of all patents in a particular field of technology impossible; since some areas of 
technology are overcrowded with patents, identifying patents of potential relevance 
is extremely difficult.133 Second, paper disclosure in some technologies, such as 
biotechnology and modern pharmaceuticals, does not enable third parties to 
replicate the invention “disclosed” in the patent application.134 A working 
requirement could help the patent overcrowding problem, at least to the extent that 
patent systems might provide stronger protection to patent owners who work their 
patents. For some inventions, a working of the invention might still be an important 
vehicle for effective disclosure.135 
 
130. Fauver, supra note 4, at 673. 
131. Reik, supra note 125, at 813 (“Authoritative German experts admit[ted] that, in order to 
understand the essence . . . of the invention described in a German patent specification, it [was] often 
necessary to consult with the corresponding United States or British specifications.”). 
132. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 563 (2009). 
133. Id. at 585. 
134. See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, The Generic Biologics Debate: Industry’s Unintended Admission 
that Biotech Patents Fail Enablement, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 10 (2006); Mark J. Stewart, The Written 
Description Requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(1): The Standard After Regents of the University of 
California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 32 IND. L. REV. 537, 549–50 (1999). 
135. See Cotropia, supra note 116, at 123 (“An actual reduction to practice requirement would 
generate more technical information about the invention.”); DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 92, 
at 43–44. 
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Another important relationship exists between working requirements and the 
rules of patentability. If a country is concerned about any actual or potential access 
problems caused by a certain type of patents, then limiting or eliminating those 
patents altogether by excluding those inventions from patentability makes a working 
requirement logically unnecessary. This somewhat mundane point is important 
from a historical perspective: before TRIPS, countries were less likely to push for 
working requirements if they were able to avoid granting patents on certain 
inventions by excluding the inventions from patentability. 
At the time that the United Kingdom was concerned about the expansion of 
the German chemical industry, a number of countries did not grant patents for 
chemical inventions at all. For example, the Swiss chemical industry was a strong 
opponent of patent protection for chemical processes in Switzerland in the 1860s–
1880s, and when a patent statute was finally adopted in Switzerland in 1887 it 
excluded chemical processes from patentability.136 This opposition was directed at 
the German chemical industry and continued until 1907.137 Following the 
experience of the Allies during WWII when German ownership of chemical patents 
caused significant problems with access to chemicals in the United States, one U.S. 
commentator in 1946 suggested that “the barring of chemical substances in 
particular from being patented as products, appear[ed] to be a desirable change in 
the United States patent laws.”138 
Not until the signing of the TRIPS Agreement was an international agreement 
concluded on rules concerning patentable subject matter;139 before TRIPS, the Paris 
Convention conferences could not agree on a list of protectable inventions.140 
Notwithstanding the high degree of harmonization of patentable subject matter in 
TRIPS, countries continue to enjoy some leeway with regard to patentability. Apart 
from the areas where TRIPS provides for possible exclusions,141 and apart from 
computer programs for which interpretations have resulted in differences in 
patentability,142 countries have found ways to limit the patentability of inventions 
when a country has had concerns about access. For example, the Indian Supreme 
Court affirmed an enhanced efficacy requirement for patents in India—a 
 
136. PENROSE, supra note 2, at 16, 124. 
137. Id. 
138. Reik, supra note 125, at 823 (“What [the author is] actually intending to emphasize here is 
that, however one may wish to proceed in the matter of those exceptions, the patent law reform should 
give priority to the compulsory licensing legislation.”). 
139. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994; 
TRIPS Agreement, Annex 1C, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.  
140. PENROSE, supra note 2, at 54. 
141. TRIPS Agreement arts. 27(2)–(3); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); D’Acry v Myriad Genetics Inc. [2015] HCA 35 (Austl.); D’Arcy 
v Myriad Genetics, Inc. [2014] FCR 115 (Austl.). 
142. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014); European Patent 
Office Enlarged Board of Appeal, Opinion G 3/08, May 12, 2010, par. 10.13. 
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requirement that is arguably directed primarily at pharmaceutical patents.143 As well, 
the allegedly increased Canadian requirement of utility that has been confirmed by 
the Canadian courts has precluded patents on some inventions in Canada, and this 
approach has affected pharmaceutical inventions more than other types of 
inventions.144 
If countries can effectively limit or eliminate patents on inventions of national 
strategic importance, their need for working requirements substantially decreases or 
fades entirely. Such an elimination or limitation of patent protection for certain 
inventions, however, might negatively affect a country’s access to certain inventions 
if inventors do not invent at all, and/or access to information about certain 
inventions if inventors choose not to disclose information about their inventions in 
instances when such information can be kept secret because the invention cannot 
be easily reverse engineered. 
International negotiations have also failed to reach a consensus on rules for 
the exhaustion of patent rights; TRIPS left open an option for countries to choose 
their adherence to the principle of either national or international exhaustion of 
intellectual property rights, such as patent rights.145 For countries that are concerned 
solely with access to patented products and have no desire to promote their own 
industries, international exhaustion may serve their needs, at least partially: even if 
a patent owner does not manufacture or import his product into the country, the 
country has access to the product if third persons can purchase the product abroad 
and import the product into the country without violating the country’s patent law. 
In such a case, a country that has adopted the principle of international exhaustion, 
but needs only access to a patented product, might not need to adopt a working 
requirement. To the extent that the country is concerned about patent owners 
blocking access to the invention globally, however, working requirements might 
need to be introduced in the country to complement the principle of international 
exhaustion. 
Provisions on working requirements will not be as important, if they are 
important at all, in countries where a patent owner’s working or nonworking of a 
patent is reflected in decisions to grant or deny an injunction to prevent third 
persons from working the invention. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the 
 
143. Novartis AG v. Union of India [Supreme Court of India] Civil Appeal Nos. 2706-2716, 
par. 103 (2013). On the allegedly heightened novelty standard for pharmaceuticals in Brazil, see 
Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Politics of Patents and Drugs in Brazil and Mexico: The Industrial Bases of 
Health Policies, 42 COMP. POL. 41, 46 (2009). 
144. See Eli Lilly v. Government of Canada, Notice of Arbitration, Sept. 12, 2013 (arguing that 
the utility requirement, as applied, causes Canada to be in violation of Article 1709(1) of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement and of Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement). 
145. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 6, Jan. 1, 1995. 
Under the principle of national exhaustion, patent rights in the country exhaust only through the first 
sale of the patented product within the country by the patent owner or with his consent. Id. Under the 
principle of international exhaustion, the first sale of the patented product anywhere in the world by 
the patent owner or with his consent exhausts the patent rights within the country that adopted the rule 
of international exhaustion. Id. 
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proposition that the nonworking of a patent, taken alone, may justify a denial of 
injunctive relief.146 The Court, however, did not foreclose the possibility that 
nonworking will be considered as one factor to be weighed when deciding whether 
to grant injunctive relief.147 In the particular case before the Court the patent owner 
was in fact open to licensing the patented invention;148 in other cases involving 
complete nonworking in the sense of blocking access to an invention, the fact of 
nonworking could receive more weight in a court’s analysis. The public interest in 
such cases may outweigh other factors.149 
If a court denies an injunction, it de facto grants a compulsory license on the 
patent,150 a result that is equivalent to the enforcement of a working requirement. 
In countries where courts have no discretion and must grant injunctive relief in 
patent infringement cases, a patent working requirement might be needed to address 
a situation for which the law in the country otherwise provides no remedy. For 
example, under German law, though courts do enjoy a certain degree of discretion 
when deciding whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction,151 courts have no 
discretion to grant or deny a permanent injunction. When a patent is presumed to 
be valid152 and the patent has been infringed, a court must issue an injunction.153 
 
146. eBay Inc v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006). 
147. Id. at 393–94; see also MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 571 (2007) 
(“[A]lthough the Supreme Court rejected an analysis implying that a categorical exclusion prevented 
injunctions from issuing if a patent holder did not practice its patents and existed only to license them, 
the Court in no way suggested that such facts could not be considered as part of the calculus in weighing 
the traditional equitable factors.”). 
148. Id. 
149. For an overview of older instances of decisions in which U.S. courts denied injunctions in 
patent infringement cases, see A. Jason Mirabito, Compulsory Patent Licensing for the United States: A 
Current Proposal, 57 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 404, 407–12 (1975). 
150. HTC Corp. v. Nokia Corp. [2013] EWHC (Pat) 3778, [32] (Eng.); cf. Paice  
L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1313, 1313 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (where the court 
distinguished between a grant of a compulsory license and the denial of an injunction combined with 
the setting of an ongoing royalty). Judge Rader opined in his concurring opinion that “calling a 
compulsory license an ‘ongoing royalty’ does not make it any less a compulsory license.” Id. at 1316 
(Rader, J., concurring). 
151. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 940, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html. 
152. In Germany, “unless a trial court determines that there is a likelihood that a claim of patent 
invalidity would be successful in a separate validity proceeding, the court adjudicates the infringement. 
If a trial court finds that a claim of patent invalidity is likely to succeed, it may stay its proceedings and 
wait for a decision by the Federal Patent Court on the issue of validity.” Marketa Trimble, The 
Extraterritorial Enforcement of Patent Rights, in PAT. ENFORCEMENT WORLDWIDE (Christopher Heath 
ed., 2015); see ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 148. 
153. Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I  
[BGBL. I], § 139(1); ZPO [Code of Civil Procedure], § 935, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html. As opposed to German courts, for which the issuance of 
permanent injunctions is automatic, the new courts that will be established in Europe under the 
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court––including courts that will be established under the Agreement 
in the territory of Germany––will have discretion to decide whether to grant or deny permanent 
injunctions. Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, art. 63(1) (“[T]he Court may grant an injunction 
against the infringer . . . .”) (emphasis added). The Agreement does not specify the factors that courts 
may or should take into consideration when exercising their discretion. 
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The remedy in German law for nonworking is a compulsory license, for which the 
Patent Act expressly provides.154 
Remedies for the nonworking of patents might also arise under competition 
law, but only to the extent that the exercise of patent rights may be deemed in 
violation of competition law rules,155 which require sufficient market power and 
which typically apply only in cases of patents that are held to be standard-essential 
patents.156 While all patents confer exclusive rights, standard-essential patents 
confer true monopolies because it is impossible to design around these patents and 
invent a new product that could successfully compete on the market in which the 
patented invention has become the standard in the industry.157 When a patented 
invention becomes a standard, competition law might provide an appropriate 
remedy for the nonworking of the patent if the patent owner has consented to 
license his patent to anyone who requests a license under fair, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms.158 The availability of redress under 
competition law renders less important any patent working requirement provisions 
that exist, at least for the purposes of redressing the nonworking of standard-
essential patents.159 
Patents that are not standard essential typically include no obligation for their 
owners to license the patents, but the “license of right” mechanism may draw 
patents that are not standard essential into a similar regime. The United Kingdom 
introduced the “license of right” mechanism in 1919;160 the mechanism allows a 
patent owner to “apply to the Comptroller to have [the] patent endorsed with the 
words ‘license of right.’”161 The endorsement means that “any person is thereafter 
entitled to a license under the patent as a matter of right. The terms of the license 
may be settled by agreement of the parties . . . [or] the Comptroller [may settle the 
license] on application by either party.”162 In Germany, the Patent Act of 1936 
introduced a “license of right” that allows a patent owner to “declare to the Patent 
Office . . . that he is prepared to allow anyone to use the invention in return for 
 
154. PatG [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BGBL. I, at §§ 24(5), 85. 
155. “[A]ntitrust law has not proved to be an effective weapon against unilateral patent 
suppression.” Saunders, supra note 126, at 432. “Thus, antitrust law has played a collateral role in 
deterring patent nonuse leading to technology suppression.” Id. at 434. 
156. Id. 
157. Alan Devlin, Antitrust Limits on Targeted Patent Aggregation, 67 FLA. L. REV. 775, 827 
(2015). 
158. Id. at 828; see also Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp., CJEU, C-170/13, July 16, 
2015. 
159. For detailed discussions of the interface between competition/antitrust law and patent law 
in the context of nonworking, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark Lemley, Unilateral 
Refusals to License, 2 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 1 (2006); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent 
System: A Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 468 (2015). 
160. Patents and Designs Act 1919, § 24 (Eng.). 
161. P.J. Federico, Compulsory Licensing in Other Countries, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 295, 305 
(1948). 
162. Id. 
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reasonable compensation.”163 Provisions for a “license of right” were eventually 
introduced in other European countries, including France, Spain, and Italy,164 and 
a “license of right” is also available for the new European patent with unitary 
effect.165 
A “license of right” thus creates an obligation similar to the obligation that 
competition law creates for standard-essential patents, and patent owners are 
obligated to license their patents. Therefore, the actual working of a “license of 
right” patent is secured whether or not someone is willing to actually work the 
patent—the “license of right” constitutes the working.166 
CONCLUSION 
A patent working requirement is a component of the patent laws in many 
countries today. The history of the requirement reflects the development of the 
different goals that countries’ patent systems have pursued at various points in 
history. These goals shaped the variations of the requirement and explain the 
positions that countries have held for the requirements over time. Perhaps it is a 
testament to the rapid economic development and technological primacy of the 
United States for a significant part of its history that its patent system included a 
patent working requirement for only a brief time. Nevertheless, a desire to 
encourage owners of U.S. patents to work their patents was not completely absent 
from U.S. patent law and remains apparent in several components of the current 
system. 
The diverse goals pursued by different countries and the differences in their 
national legal systems make the harmonizing of provisions on patent working 
requirements difficult, particularly because there is an absence of both (1) an 
agreement on a single goal or a set of goals that all countries want to pursue for all 
technologies, and (2) an overall alignment of national legal systems. A developed 
country with a broad manufacturing capacity might not need the same type of 
working requirement that a developing country with nascent industries might need. 
Or a country in which courts must grant injunctions in patent infringement cases 
with no discretion otherwise might have to maintain a patent working requirement 
to prevent nonworking, while another country might resolve the same issue partially 
 
163. Ilja Rudyk, Three Essays on the Economics and Design of Patent Systems 1, 9 (2012)  
(Ph.D. dissertation). On the original motivation for the provision in the German Patent Act, see id. at 
12–13. 
164. Id. at 14. 
165. Council Regulation 1257/2012 of Dec. 17, 2012 (implementing enhanced cooperation in 
the area of the creation of unitary patent protection). 
166. For a proposal for a similar solution for U.S. patents, see Sichelman, supra note 6; Federico, 
supra note 161, at 306 (in the United Kingdom “[f ]rom 1921 to 1939, the number of patents endorsed 
[‘license of right’] averaged 690 per year, which is about 4 per cent of the average number of patents 
granted each year.”); Rudyk, supra note 163, at 3 (in 2008 in Germany a “[l ]icense of right has been 
declared for more than 4,500 German patent applications,” meaning 6% of all German patent 
applications). For detailed statistics on the use of “license of right” in Germany, see id. at 15–39. 
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or completely by allowing court discretion in the granting of injunctions. As the 
other components of legal systems must be, patent working requirements of 
individual countries must be compared at a functional level within the context of 
the legal system in which they operate. 
Critics of patent working requirements often point to the fact that the 
requirements are rarely enforced, meaning that that patents are rarely revoked and 
compulsory licenses are rarely issued because of a failure to fulfill the 
requirements.167 However, the incidences of enforcement of a component of a legal 
system are a weak indicator of the efficacy of that component. Even without 
enforcement actions, the mere existence of the component may guide and influence 
behavior. 
An analysis of the development of the patent working requirement at national 
levels and in international negotiations raises important questions about methods 
of international harmonization. International harmonization increasingly focuses on 
specific wordings that should be adopted verbatim in national legislation, rather 
than outlines of general guiding principles that should be implemented in national 
legislation. This greater specificity might be prompted by a desire to improve the 
global legal environment for businesses that could benefit from uniform national 
laws, and the greater specificity might contribute to increased compliance with 
international law when specific treaty provisions are directly applicable (self-
executing) in jurisdictions that allow for the direct applicability of international 
treaties. The resulting identical language in national laws can have the advantage of 
contributing to further legal harmonization in agency and court interpretations, 
rulings, and decisions. Conversely, greater specificity might make treaty 
implementation more difficult if specific rules are inconsistent with the internal 
consistency of a national legal system. 
Some commentators suggest that international harmonization, including 
harmonization that may affect patent working requirements, should be viewed from 
an internationalist perspective—a perspective that considers the global welfare.168 
As is representative for this view, Guillermo Cabanellas noted that “[t]he real world 
is one where more than a hundred industrial property systems coexist and where 
the consequences of one country’s laws bear not only on that country but also on 
the rest of the countries of the world.”169 Unfortunately, the internationalist 
perspective cannot maximize global welfare without an international coordination 
of laws among countries. Until this coordination exists—if it ever does—and while 
countries respect only the interests of their various local stakeholders, countries will 
subordinate the idea of global welfare and continue to pursue only their own 
interests. Patent working requirements should be tailored to ensure that countries 
achieve their individual goals and meet the needs of their own legal systems. 
 
167. E.g., Reik, supra note 125, at 815. 
168. Carlos M. Correa, Internationalization of the Patent System and New Technologies, 20  
WIS. INT’L L.J. 523 (2001–2002). 
169. Cabanellas, supra note 117, at 166. 
